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RECENT DECISIONS
Practice - Change of Venue Because of Local Prejudice; Abuse of
Discretion - Plaintiff's three minor sons drowned in a water-filled hole
excavated by defendant contractors. In an action based upon alleged
negligence, the defendants applied for a writ of mandamus to compel
the trial court to set aside its order denying the defendants' motion
for a change of venue. Defendants predicated error upon the trial
court's refusal to grant the change on the ground that an impartial
trial could not be had in the county in which the action was brought
by reason of excitement and sympathy created, by the accident, and
because of unfavorable newspaper publicity. The county newspapers
publicized the financial condition of the parents, reported the progress
of a relief fund for them, and discussed the likelihood that defendants
were protected by insurance against accidents. Defendants' contentions
of local prejudice were supported by 18 affidavits, and plaintiff con-
troverted these by 15 coanter-affidavits. Held: writ denied. The ques-
tion of whether a change of venue should be granted because an im-
partial trial cannot be had in the county wherein the action is pending
is a matter very largely in the sound discretion of the trial court, and
its decision will not be reversed except for a clear abuse of discretion.
Sander v. Dieseth, 40 N.W. (2d) 844 (Minn., 1950).
Appellate courts, in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of
discretion, are reluctant to overturn a trial court's discreti6n on a
change of venue sought by reason of local prejlpdice.2 Abuse of dis-
cretion has been defined as "a clearly erroneous conclusion and judg-
ment; one that is clearly against the logic and effects of the facts pre-
sented in support of and against the application" for a change of
venue.
3
Wisconsin has a change of venue statute similar to the Minnesota
statute here.4 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has consistently upheld
the discretion exercised by its trial courts in the matter of local pre-
judice where the discretion has been supported by uncontroverted
facts, 5 where it has been supported by facts as against opinions in con-
MINN. STATS. 542.11 (1945) "The venue of any civil action may be changed by
order of the court in the following cases: . . . (3) When an impartial trial
cannot be had in the county wherein the action is pending;"2 Guyer v. Smullen, 160 Minn. 114, 199 N.W. 465 (1924); State ex rel. Austin
Mut. Ins. Co. v. District Court of Brown County, 194 Minn. 595, 261 N.W. 701(1935) ; Dice v. Johnson, 187 Iowa 1134, 175 N.W. 38 (1919) ; Church v. City
of Milwaukee, 31 Wis. 512 (1872) ; 56 Am. Jur., Venue secs. 56 and 74.3 Edwards v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. Rep. 306, 131 P.956, 44 L.R.A. (U.S.) 701
(1913).4
wIs. STATS. 261.04 (1947) "The court or the presiding judge thereof may
change the place of trial in the following cases: (1) When there is reason
to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had in the designated county and
when so changed it shall be to a county in which the cause complained of does
not exist."
5 Church v. City of Milwaukee, 31 Wis. 512 (1872), where the Supreme Court
upheld change of venue for local prejudice based upon 3 fact-reciting affidavits,
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flicting affidavits, 6 where the personal knowledge and observation of
the trial judge has been a factor in the exercise of the discretionary
power,7 and also where the discretionary power was exercised upon
facts in opposing affidavits lending themselves to conflicting conclu-
sions.8
In the instant case a mere numerical preponderance of affidavits in
support of the requested change of venue did not prevent either a
trial court denial of such change or an appellate court affirmance of
such denial. On the other hand, where a Wisconsin trial court in Cyra
v. Stewart9 denied change of venue and where the overwhelming pre-
ponderance (151 to 38) of affidavits was against a change of venue,
the Supreme Court reversed on the ground of abuse of discretion
for the reason that the discretion was not based upon evidence or facts,
in that the 151 affidavits did not recite facts but contained mere con-
clusions or opinions. The decision here against the mere numerical
preponderance of affidavits is thus not unprecedented.
The Cyra case, unlike the instant one, did reverse for abuse of
discretion. It thus gives us one positive standard for reversible abuse
of discretion. It says that, on the question of local prejudice, facts
must prevail over mere opinions and that to ignore facts in favor of
opinions is reversible abuse of discretion by a trial court. A later Wis-
consin decision in Belden v. Field,10 reversing for abuse of discretion,
gives us another positive standard for reversible abuse of discretion.
There the Supreme Court held that denial of a change of venue re-
quested by the defendant in an action brought in the county by the
county judge as plaintiff was abuse of discretion. While other Wiscon-
including that of the plaintiff, which were unopposed by anything offered by
the defendant.6 Lego v. Shaw, 38 Wis. 401 (1910), where the Supreme Court said: "Mere
statements of the belief or opinion of parties or witnesses as to the existence
of local prejudice and influence, or adverse interest, will not be taken; but
facts and circumstances showing the impossibility of obtaining an impartial
trial must be fully and clearly presented, so that the court can judge for
itself whether the application is well founded."
7 Jackman Will Case, 27 Wis. 409 (1871), where in the contesting of a will thejudge was aware that the sympathies of throngs of local people in the court
room and in the hotels where jurors boarded were warmly with the con-
testants and against the executors. The Supreme Court held: "We cannot
say that there was an abuse of discretion in the present case. In reaching
the conclusion that the motion ought to be denied, the learned circuit judge
may have been influenced by his personal observation and knowledge to which
he might properly resort."8 Schattschneider v. Johnson, 39 Wis. 387 (1876), where voluminous affidavits
were read in support of and against a motion for change of venue because
of local prejudice, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court change of venue
and said: "Those (affidavits) read in support of the motion, considered alone,
are entirely sufficient to justify, if not to require, a change of the place of
trial; opposing affidavits materially weaken the force of those read in support.
Yet, considering all of the affidavits, we are inclined to think that the place
of trial ought to have been changed."
9 79 Wis. 72, 48 N.W. 50 (1891).10211 Wis. 485, 248 N.W. 417 (1933).
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sin statutes" applicable to a judge's interest in local litigation were
relied upon in reversing the trial court, the element of local prejudice
was a factor in the case and is necessarily implied in the statutes relied
upon in that decision.
The Cyra and Belden cases are the only decisions in Wisconsin
where the Supreme Court has reversed for abuse of discretion in the
matter of local prejudice. Such rarity of Wisconsin decisions indi-
cates the reluctance of appellate courts to interfere with the trial court
exercise of discretion.
To the writer this reluctance, as exemplified in the instant case,
seems to be carried too far. Certainly no fault can be found where
affidavits on the issue of local prejudice are mere recitals of opinions
or conclusions. However, where there is a close question of fact to
be determined by the trial court, as appears here, discretionary power
as upheld by the appellate court is too broad. Surely a change of
venue to a more remote and disinterested jurisdiction cannot be pre-
judicial to either party, whereas denial of change of venue where there
is a close question of fact might be unduly prejudicial to the party
seeking the change.
No doubt the practical answer is that excitement, sympathy and
possible local prejudice evaporates with time, particularly where liti-
gation is delayed, and that change of venue would be the vexatious
rule instead of the infrequent exception in an urban community where
much litigation occurs. However, practical considerations can not ob-
scure the fact that local prejudice can be initially present, and may
linger to the detriment of the party seeking the change of venue.
GILBE:RT A. SCHNEMER
Taxation - Patent Infringement Damages as Taxable Income -
Plaintiff, a cash basis taxpayer, alleged in his complaint for patent in-
fringement that he had been deprived of "large gains and profits" and
prayed that the defendant be enjoined, that it be ordered to pay over
both the profits derived from the infringement and the damages which
the plaintiff had suffered therefrom. At the hearing before the master,
the plaintiff abandoned his claim for profits, choosing only to press
the claim for damages. In his report the master recommended that the
award of the plaintiff be increased to make the taxpayer's recovery
"more nearly adequate to compensate him for the damage to his busi-
ness under his patent" and the court, following this recommendation,
increased the award over forty-five thousand dollars. The judgment
finally entered included damages for patent infringement, interest, the
increase in the award, and the loss of profits on foreign sales. In his
Federal income tax return for 1944, the plaintiff reported as taxable
"1wis. STATS. 261.01, 261.06, 270.16 (1931).
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